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INTRODUCTION

It is trite to say that the world is becoming smaller, yet it is true.
For all of us who travel for business or pleasure, horizons expand and
widen, and as we travel from country to country, and continent to
continent, the challenges for lawyers become more complex and
demanding. No longer is it sufficient to understand the laws and practice
competently within your own jurisdiction, be it the United States or
another country. Once it was enough to do the best you could within your
own system, however, it is now necessary to ensure you get the best, by
considering all forums and jurisdictions which play a part in the particular
case. This is all the more true when the wrongdoer is an international
corporation operating throughout the world, seeking to take cover behind
conventions, jurisdictions, or the weaknesses of a particular local legal
system. If you are to serve those you represent, to ensure that those who
commit wrongful acts against your clients are brought to justice, you must
not only look to your own legal system but beyond to other forums and
determine where the interests of your clients will best be served in the
complex matrix of laws, countries, jurisdictions, and philosophies which
may apply to any one case.
Head of Litigation, Levy & McRae, Glasgow, Scotland; L.L.B., University of
Edinburgh; B.A., University of Strathclyde.
The Board of Editors wishes to thank Professor Paul R Joseph for his help and assistance in
soliciting this article for publication.
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The village of Lockerbie has a population of approximately 3000
and is populated by sheep, cattle, and farmers. It is situated in southwest
Scotland and is as remote from the world of international corporations,
terrorism, treaties, and issues of conflicting laws as one could imagine. Yet,
on December 21, 1988 at 7:03 p.m., Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over the
village of Lockerbie, killing 259 passengers and crew members, eleven
residents in the village, and maiming many others both physically and
psychologically. Lockerbie soon became the focus of one of the worlds
biggest criminal investigations tracking down terrorists. The city was also
the center of one of the greatest, or indeed perhaps the greatest, law suits of
modern times. The families of the deceased and the injured banded together
to discover the identity of the terrorists and their method for overcoming the
security of the airports.
The task facing the relatives was enormous. Pan Am was an
international airline, and an American rorporation, experienced in dealing
with claims arising out of accidents and terrorist incidents. Within hours of
this tragedy, it was represented by teams of the world's finest lawyers, loss
adjusters, and public relations experts. Pan Am was protected by the
Warsaw Convention, which limits damages to a derisory level.
Additionally, this tragedy took place in the skies over Scotland, a country
with its own legal system under which damages for wrongful death are
notoriously low.
Before the smoke had cleared from the wreckage and from the
burning homes of Lockerbie, rumors abounded as to how such a tragedy
could have taken place. Soon after, loss adjusters appeared on the scene
and advised families that they should accept the Warsaw Convention limit
which was generously offered for those who were prepared to sign. Some
who were approached were advised to stay away from "ambulance chasing
lawyers" who could do nothing for them since the Warsaw Convention
limits damages.
Simultaneously, stories appeared in the press which pointed out that
the airlines could do little or nothing to avoid the efforts of determined and
clever terrorists who planned to, and were prepared to, circumvent airline
security. We were reminded many times that Pan Am security was as good
as, if not better than, any other airline in the world. For those left bereaved,
and for those left injured, it became much like the Biblical story of David
and Goliath. Isolated and financially weak individuals were facing the
enormity of an international corporation surrounded with all the might of
the international aviation insurance industry.
Unfortunately for Pan Am and their insurers, Britain was no
stranger to disasters. From 1985 to 1988, Britain was the site of three major
disasters. These were the Manchester air crash, which killed fifty-four
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people in 1985, the North sea crash of a chinook helicopter carrying fiftyfive oil workers in 1986, and the Piper Alpha off-shore oil platform
explosion which killed 165 people. The attorneys involved in these cases
learned to network. They also learned that insurers pick off clients, one at a
time, to divide and settle, if not to conquer. The attorneys learned to forum
shop and to seek out the best courts and the best legal systems available.
They learned to use what was good in our own system to assist in
investigation or, in the alternative, to take the litigation somewhere else.
The legal system in Scotland moved quickly with the help of the
Law Society of Scotland. Attorneys who had been involved in mass
disaster cases and "foreign" litigation were quickly summoned to assist.
The Lockerbie Air Disaster Group was formed.
Each attorney, whether based in Scotland, England, or elsewhere,
continued to represent the interests of individual clients. The attorneys
were encouraged to join the Lockerbie Air Disaster Group as a coordinating
body. The Group was led by a Steering Committee consisting of lawyers
experienced in international litigation. Its job was to coordinate the claims
and to represent the interest of all claimants as well as to seek out, retain,
and advise the best attorneys from the forum chosen for litigation. It would
also be the Air Disaster Group's job to coordinate and direct the legal
investigation to all claims arising out of the disaster. Within a matter of
weeks of the disaster, the attorneys were in pursuit of Pan Am.
The Air Disaster Group had some important decisions to make.
The attorneys needed to understand the strengths and the weaknesses in
their own legal system and the choices of forum open to them. From the
beginning, Pan Am posited that it could defeat any attempt to establish
willful misconduct which would be necessary if we were to lift the Warsaw
Convention monetary damage limits. Pan Am, and its insurers, made it
plain that damages would be offered up to the Warsaw limit but not above
and that this condition was not negotiable. In assessing the Scottish legal
system, the attorneys found that the weaknesses considerably outnumbered
the strengths. The strengths were obvious: home ground and knowing how
to make the system work well. Another strength was the opportunity, both
formally and informally, to follow the official investigators into the disaster
area and to pick up information as soon as it was made available. More
importantly, some form of official inquiry would be held under Scottish
statute since the crew had died within its jurisdiction. There would have to
be a Fatal Accident Inquiry or, at the very least, a Public Inquiry. The
official inquiry would be brought by the Crown, who would require the
inquiry to take place in open court before a judge, with the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and exhibits.

206

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 2:203

We knew that such an inquiry would provide an opportunity for
discovery of information beyond anything available in the United States.
This wealth of information would give us a chance to take litigation beyond
Scotland to America, the home of Pan Am. The damages available to those
affected by this tragedy, whether passengers or those on the ground, would
be miserably small and insignificant in Scotland, in comparison to those
which might be awarded by a jury in America, provided that we could prove
willful misconduct by Pan Am.
It then became necessary to seek out attorneys in the United States.
Those attorneys experienced in litigating in the States view this process as
the "beauty parade." Ultimately, Stuart Speiser of Speiser, Krause, Madole
& Nolan of New York chose to represent those within the Lockerbie Air
Disaster Group.
It was decided that the British cases, which included ground claims,
would be pursued in Florida. Aaron Podhurst, a Miami attorney, handled
these cases. ALERT, the company responsible for providing security to Pan
Am 103, was a Florida based corporation. Since it was not an airline,
ALERT did not enjoy protection under the Warsaw Convention, a clear
advantage. Stuart Speiser and his team would work closely with others,
notably Lee Kreindler, in the United States representing the families of
passengers. Both Speiser and Kreindler have international reputations in
aviation cases.
The decision was made to exhaust our opportunities by way of
discovery and investigation within the Scottish legal system. A decision
was also made, however, to remove any litigation from that system, which
was one which would short change the widows and orphans, to the United
States. The consensus among the attorneys was that realistic damages could
be recovered in America, where a body of expertise in dealing with such
cases existed.
In Scotland, as .in England, no contingency fee system exists and
Furthermore, the
litigation would deliver inconsequential damages.
Scottish and English system have little experience in aviation cases, in
which a jury would probably not be allowed to decide an issue such as
"willful misconduct." This type of issue is generally regarded as too
complex and too difficult for juries and is left for judges to decide.
As a result, we have a system where widows and orphans are shortchanged and where the courts are open only to those who are very wealthy
and can afford to instruct attorneys. Moreover, the system is open to those
who have the benefit of publicly funded litigation through a system of legal
aid, which is largely restricted to people who are unemployed and have
never been granted in a multi-party litigation case such as the Lockerbie
disaster. In contrast, the contingency fee system in the United States has, as
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a matter of fact and not of conjecture, granted greater access to the courts
for those who have suffered from the wrongful acts of others.
Wrongful death litigation is expensive in the United States. Large
damage settlements are not only a proper reflection of damages for those
bereaved or seriously injured, but the settlements also provide an economic
imperative to promote and encourage change and the improvement of safety
standards. A system which allows juries to decide these issues, coupled
together with the contingency fee system, provides an opportunity for those
affected by such tragedies to retain skilled representation and ensures that
David stands equal with Goliath.
II.

THE FATAL ACCIDENT INQUIRY

The Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) took place between October 1,
1990, and February 13, 1991. The members of the Air Disaster Group were
hard at work with the inquiries, discovery, investigation, and paper work
within a few weeks of the tragedy. The FAI was an opportunity to present
some of the information in our possession, to flush out information which
we suspected but could not prove, and to see a preview of the defense that
Pan Am would ultimately mount if we ever managed to get the matter to
trial in the United States.
The FAI was successful beyond our wildest dreams. Pan Am had
joined the battle but was soundly beaten. This encounter was the first of a
relentless series of defeats for Pan Am. We were now in a position to show
that the willful misconduct verdict returned in New York on July 10, 1992,
withstood the rigors of the American appellate system and stands as a final
verdict. The only the question left to resolve was the issue of damages.
III.

WHAT WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE FATAL ACCIDENT INQUIRY?

We established that this disaster occurred as a result of a bomb, "an
improvised explosive device," being placed within a Toshiba radio situated
in a brown Samsonite suitcase. The location of the suitcase established
beyond doubt the suitcase was an interline bag; namely, it had come from
another carrier and had been placed on a Pan Am flight at some point in its
journey. From its location, we were able to establish it could only have
been loaded on the airplane at Frankfurt, Germany.
Furthermore, the baggage tags led to a precise paper trail which
established that the bag in question was an interline transfer bag from Air
Malta Flight 180. The unaccompanied bag was placed on Pan Am 103A, a
feeder flight, and was transferred to Flight 103 at Heathrow Airport, outside
London. We also established the bags transferred from Pan Am 103A were
taken directly from that aircraft to Pan Am 103, and that they were not
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counted or weighed. Moreover, they were not reconciled with the passenger
manifest, and they were not x-rayed at Heathrow. Thus, the bag, which was
loaded at Frankfurt, traveled to London and was loaded on Flight 103
without being identified as an unaccompanied bag.
Additionally, we established one of the two Libyans now being
sought for the bombing was the Libyan Arab Airlines station manager at
Malta who had unlimited access to the baggage area for Air Malta flights.
Libyan Airlines used the same baggage tickets as Air Malta, and on
December 21, 1988, the Libyan Airlines flight to Tripoli was processed at
the same time and at the same counter as Air Malta Flight 180.
Furthermore, the security procedures at Malta were symbolic at best.
IV.

How DID THESE TERRORISTS OVERCOME THE MOST SOPHISTICATED
AIRLINE SECURITY IN THE BUSINESS?

In May 1986, Pan Am instituted a massive marketing and
advertising campaign to regain the confidence of international travelers,
particularly those in America whose confidence in travel had been
undermined by numerous terrorist threats. Advertisements were run in
newspapers outlining Pan Am's new security system entitled "ALERT."
The aim was to make Pan Am the safest airline in the world. Pan Am even
charged a surcharge of $5.00 per ticket to pay for this new unparalleled
security system. We discovered, however, that the funds gathered were
never allocated to security but were being used by the airline, which already
was in deep financial trouble.
Pan Am staged a show of guard dogs sniffing suit cases at New
York's Kennedy Airport. These dogs had coats on their backs with the
name ALERT. The reality, as we discovered, was that the dogs had been
hired from a cat and dog home, knew nothing, and were not trained to detect
The dogs were bewildered, rented for the day, and
explosives.
accomplished nothing more than to urinate over the suit cases.
We discovered, in September 1986, Pan Am obtained a private
security report from Israeli security experts who provided advice to a
number of airlines, including El Al, the Israeli state airline. The report
revealed Pan Am was very exposed to terrorist attack, particularly from
unaccompanied bags and plastic explosives. Pan Am relied too heavily on
x-rays for screening bags and needed procedures for baggage reconciliation.
Particularly in matching bags to the passenger manifest and identify any
unaccompanied bags. The report warned Pan Am it had simply been good
luck which had saved them from disasters.
We also discovered the man in charge of the ALERT operation in
Frankfurt and responsible for the security of Pan Am flights had a criminal
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record. His hiring practices had more to do with his personal orientation
than with any other relevant factor. The employees responsible for
operating the x-ray screeners were largely untrained. The training video
was shown in English and many of the employees did not speak English.
Positive passenger baggage reconciliation was long recognized as
an important element in the system designed to prevent the carriage of
unaccompanied bags. Unaccompanied bags were a well-established method
used by terrorists to get bombs on board airline flights. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) required a positive match of bags to
boarding passengers in airports which were classified as extraordinary
security risks airports. Frankfurt and London had been categorized by the
Under FAA rules, once an
FAA as falling into that category.
unaccompanied bag was identified at one of the high risk locations, it could
only be carried on board an aircraft if physically searched. Pan Am had
abandoned this positive matching process without written approval in
February 1987 at Heathrow and in July 1988 at Frankfurt. Without
permission from the FAA, Pan Am had substituted what they described as
The new
an "administrative match and positive passenger control."
administrative match and positive passenger control system was inadequate
because it did not deal with interline bags. Pan Am was aware of their duty
to meet the FAA Regulations. The rule was contained in their manuals as
required by law, and although it was an explicit requirement, they simply
abandoned it. The decision to ignore the rule was taken at the highest
corporate level. To abandon this requirement and to substitute x-ray
procedures was a clear indication that Pan Am's motivations were profit
and cost-cutting. As a result, Pan Am exposed its passengers to risk by
being unable to detect unaccompanied bags. The Lockerbie disaster would
have been avoided had the FAA requirements had been followed.
V.

WARNINGS
Pan Am also had another question to answer. In April 1988, the
FAA warned all international airlines of intelligence reports of threats by
Iran against United States targets. On November 18, 1988, Pan Am was
advised by an FAA Security Bulletin that a Middle Eastern terrorist group
had been found in Germany with a bomb concealed within a Toshiba radio.
The alert called upon Pan Am and other airlines to activate extra vigilance
and a rigorous adherence to their regulations for baggage reconciliation.
Pan Am and others were warned of the difficulty of relying on x-rays which
would not detect such bombs. Despite this explicit warning, Pan Am did
not positively match interline bags, even worse, the ALERT security staff in
Frankfurt was not made aware of this warning. Not even the personnel
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using the x-ray equipment were told of this warning. They did not know,
and were unaware of what to look for.
On December 7, 1988, only two weeks before the Lockerbie
disaster, Pan Am was issued a Security Bulletin advising that the United
States Embassy in Helsinki, Finland received a warning that a Pan Am
flight from Frankfurt to the United States would be the target of a bomb.
The notice became known as the "Helsinki Warning." It referred to and
reiterated the FAA's earlier warning of a Toshiba radio bomb and again
emphasized the difficulty of detection by x-ray. Once again the security
personnel at Frankfurt, including ALERT's chief of training, were not
informed of the bulletin. Pan Am not only failed to increase security staff,
they failed to alert the on duty security staff to the warnings. When he
eventually received the Helsinki Warning, the manager at Frankfurt
attempted to back date it and to suggest that he had disseminated it. He had
not. His statement demonstrated blatant dishonesty.
The inquiry revealed much more both in substance and in detail, but
I am sure having heard the story, it will come as no surprise to you that on
July 10, 1992, the New York jury concluded that Pan Am and ALERT were
guilty of willful misconduct. The fight goes on now for damages, Pan Am
having unsuccessfully tried every avenue of Appeal against the jury's
verdict. David has held his own against Goliath.
For the American legal system, it is a triumph in serving the
interests of the individual over the might of the corporation and the giants of
the insurance world. The attorney has excelled in his role as equalizer and
champion. The judicial system has worked. The combination of jury trial
and contingency fees has made it possible for litigation to be pursued in the
most suitable forum, doing justice to those who deserve it.
As a footnote, once the picture of the incompetence, deceit,
dishonesty, and risk-taking emerged from the Fatal Accident Inquiry, it
became clear that the insurance industry should rigorously re-examine
security practices at airports as executed by airlines.
VI.

STANDARD IMPROVED - WHY? - THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE

The economic imperative is very simple. The insurance industry
probably realized during the course of the Fatal Accident Inquiry that Pan
Am's chances of winning the litigation were declining by the day and the
prospects for lifting of the Warsaw Convention limits were increasing. A
huge pay-out was becoming a certainty. To ensure that another such payout would not occur, the insurance industry must make sure security
practices were adopted which would prevent unaccompanied interline bags
from getting on board planes which they insured. It was the insurance
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industry and not the government that pushed for improvements. The
insurance industry ultimately has the power to compel the passage of and
compliance with these safety measures. The threat of large damage awards
made these efforts imperative.
Those who seek to attack the American system do so in part
because of large damage awards. In all of the arguments made to date, little
has been said concerning the benefits that flow from such awards. The
contingency fee system is criticized for making lawyers rich. Little is said
of the huge risk which lawyers take in becoming involved in such cases. It
was the contingency fee system which made available to the families
affected by the Lockerbie air disaster a team of world-class attorneys able,
and the resources necessary, to take on the might of Pan Am's top-class,
blue-chip team. Would it be right that Pan Am and the insurers could
bring together the very best teams of attorneys to represent their interests
while those who find themselves facing tragedy through no fault of their
own are to be denied representation at the same level? Without jury awards
and contingency fees, and both are essential, it is doubtful whether the
result so far achieved would have been realized. It would not have been
achieved in Piper Alpha. I am aware of the proposed legislative changes
seeking to interfere, control, and restrict the system. My advice would be,
"Don't fix what is not broken."

